Legitimizing Defection: How The Merger Clause Undermines India’s Anti-Defection Regime
- IJLLR Journal
- May 12
- 1 min read
Garima Kanwal, Ph.D Research Scholar at Maharishi Markandeshwar University Mullana, Ambala (Haryana).
Dr. Poonam Lamba, Assistant Professor of Law at Maharishi Markandeshwar University Mullana, Ambala (Haryana).
ABSTRACT
The Anti-Defection Law was introduced through the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment, 1985 to tackle the growing problem of political defections of the ministers and to ensure stable governance. When the Constitution originally came into force, it did not specifically address the role of political parties or the issue of defection. However, with time as frequent party-switching began to disrupt democratic functioning and weakened public confidence, the need for legal regulation became utmost important. The Tenth Schedule therefore was enacted to bring discipline among legislators. Despite this, the exception provided under Paragraph 4 of the 10th Schedule, which deals with mergers, has increasingly become a point of concern. Instead of allowing real and genuine party changes, it is often used to justify large-scale defections. The article discusses the interpretation and implementation of the merger provision in light to the recent political developments pertaining Raghav Chadha and other Members in 2026. It points out the inconsistency in the law where individual defection is punished under the 10th Schedule but collective defection with the support of two-thirds of the legislature party is often protected. It is argued that this gap between legal permissibility and constitutional values has led to the failure of the Anti-Defection Law. The study concludes that there is a clear need for better and more precise laws to prevent misuse and to protect the fairness and trust of the democratic system in India.
