The Anti-Defection Regime In India: Balancing Stability And Dissent
- IJLLR Journal
- Jun 2
- 2 min read
Shatakshi Kumar, Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University
Dr. Nikunj Singh Yadav, Assistant Professor, Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University
ABSTRACT
India’s anti-defection regime emerged to address several issues stemming from politically motivated opportunistic floor-crossing, executive 'horse-trading', and the collapse of parliamentary majorities. The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, and further modifications by the Ninety- first Amendment of that year sought to constitutionalise party loyalty and facilitate the disqualification of legislators for voluntarily resigning their party positions or for acting counter to their party’s position. The focus of this paper is to ascertain whether the Indian model strikes an appropriate equilibrium between the stability of the government and dissent in a democracy. By employing a doctrinal, comparative and institutional approach, it attempts to assess the constitutional text, the Supreme Court's position, legislative practice and the comparative literature on party disloyalty which has been published in peer-reviewed journals. It is the author's contention that while some forms of individual floor crossing may have been substantially curtailed by the Indian regime, three costs to democracy have been created: the excessive centralization of power in party leadership, the erosion of parliamentary democracy through the loss of ‘deliberative’ representation and the adoption of strategic forms of manipulation through the resignation of members, the merging of parties and the delaying of decisions. The comparative literature indicates that anti- defection legislation is not necessarily anti-democratic. Such legislation may be seen as democratically legitimate when the legislation is limited to narrow and clearly defined circumstances, there is independent adjudication, the procedures are transparent and there is a safeguarding of the right to express legislative dissent. It is the author's view that India is justified in maintaining a stability protection rule in respect of confidence, no-confidence and money bills, but should abolish the disqualification of members for the breach of other votes. Such changes would retain the overarching constitutional goal of ensuring the government functions while also preventing the loss of representatives.
Keywords: party discipline, anti-defection laws, legislative dissent, parliamentary democracy, constitutional law, India
